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Secondary Consumer Picketing:

The First Amendment Questions
Remain
By Curtis L. Mack*

and
Risa L. Lieberwitz**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has been faced many times with the
question of the constitutionality of governmental restrictions on picketing
in light of the first amendment protection of free speech. In these decisions, the Court has applied various approaches and tests in an effort to
resolve the tension between governmental interests in controlling picketing and individual rights of expression consistent with the first amendment. The Court has confronted these issues particularly in the area of
secondary consumer picketing, which is regulated by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.' These issues surfaced
*
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gan State University (B.A., 1970); Akron University Law School (J.D., 1970); University of
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1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) reads as follows:
Section 8(b) . . . it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents...
(4)(ii) to threaten, coerce or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an objective thereof is
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring
any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the
representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title:
Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make
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first in 1957 with the enactment of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B),2 which was interpreted by the Supreme Court in 1964 in NLRB v. FruitPackers Local
760 (Tree Fruits)3 and recently in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees
Union Local 1001 (Safeco).4 Though confronted by difficult first amendment questions in both cases, a majority of the Court refused to come to
grips with the inherent conflicts between governmental regulation of secondary consumer picketing and the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech. Instead, the Court glossed over the issues, superficially
concluding that no conflict exists.
This article will examine the Supreme Court's treatment of the constitutional issues involved in governmental control of picketing in general,
and will identify the Court's varying approaches over the years. This discussion will, of course, involve a comparison of the Court's resolution of
similar questions presented in cases involving different types of picketing.
The Court's analysis of picketing in general will then be compared with
the Court's treatment of secondary consumer picketing in particular, in
an effort to identify whether the Court has been consistent in its approach to first amendment questions presented in all picketing cases.
Such a comparison will reveal that the Court provides lesser protection of
freedom of expression in the context of secondary consumer picketing, as
opposed to political and other types of labor picketing. This lowered constitutional shield is apparently attributable to the Court's pragmatic approach to secondary consumer picketing. Analysis of case law in the area
discloses that the Court has afforded reduced constitutional protection to
secondary consumer picketing that has a substantial economic impact on
the neutral secondary employer. The conclusion can be drawn, therefore,
that control of effective picketing will be permitted by the Court. The
danger of such an approach is that enforcement of first amendment rights
is measured in monetary terms and will be protected only when picketing

unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing
. . . Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing
contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than
picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers
and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by
an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of
inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer
in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any
goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution. ...
2. See the discussion of the legislative debate concerning the first amendment issues in
the 1957 amendment to § 8(b)(4), at notes 38-39 infra and accompanying text.
3. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
4. 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
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is ineffectual.
II.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO PICKETING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

During the past four decades, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the
question of the validity of governmental regulation of picketing. The
starting point for a discussion of these cases must be Thornhill v. Alabama.5 In that case, a state statute prohibiting loitering and picketing of
businesses was applied against one of the members of a peaceful picket
line. The picketer had peacefully asked an employee of the picketed business not to report to work. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the conviction of the picket line member, finding the state statute unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments.

Thornhill is significant for its strong statements in support of first
amendment rights of individuals in labor disputes. The Court stated that
" . . . the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor
dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is
guaranteed by the Constitution." The Court emphasized that the means
of disseminating such economic information may convince others not to
engage in business relations with the picketed employer; such successful
persuasion is, however, an improper basis upon which to impose govern7
mental restrictions on methods of expression.

Since Thornhill, the Supreme Court has both upheld and struck down
various state regulations of picketing, and has applied different theories
to measure the constitutionality of a particular regulation. One such theory centers on the question of whether picketing is carried out in furtherance of an "illegal objective," as described in federal or state legislation.
This approach involves judicial analysis of the legitimate and substantial
nature of the governmental interest sought to be fulfilled through regulation of picketing.9 Two early cases which reflect this approach are Bakery
& Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl1 0 and Carpenters & Joiners Local

No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe." In Wohl, the union peacefully picketed in the
vicinity of bakeries which sold goods to non-union independent bakery
5. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
6. Id. at 102. See also, AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). Contrast, Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507 (1976), in which the Court found the first amendment inapplicable to labor
picketing carried out on private property.
7. 310 U.S. at 104-05. See Etelson, Picketing and Freedom of Speech: Comes the Evolution, 10 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 1, 2 (1976).
8. Etelson, supra note 7, at 1-10.
9. See Note, First Amendment Analysis of Peaceful Picketing, 28 MAINE L. REv. 203,
204 (1976).
10. 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
11. 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
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route drivers. The state trial court enjoined the picketing, despite its
finding that the picketing had neither caused any customers to cease doing business with the bakeries, nor caused economic loss to the non-union
bakery route drivers, who were the subject of the picketing. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the picketers did not "abuse
, * .the right to free speech" 1' by engaging in unlawful conduct such as
"violence, force or coercion."'
Ritter's Cafe, decided the same day as Wohl, provides a contrast to the
latter decision, as the Supreme Court upheld a state court injunction of
picketing by union members. In Ritter's Cafe, union members picketed
Ritter's restaurant in protest of Ritter's employment of non-union employees to construct a building not connected with the restaurant. The
picketing resulted in a sixty percent business loss to Ritter's restaurant.
The state court found that the picketing, "the avowed purpose" of which
was to force Ritter to employ union members for the construction work,
violated a state anti-trust law. In upholding the injunction, the majority
made it clear that state legislatures could set limits on picketing by "impos[ing] reasonable regulations for the protection of the community as a
whole ...."" The state could, therefore, enjoin picketing carried out in
furtherance of an objective proscribed by governmental regulations.
The Supreme Court again applied the "illegal objective" theory to uphold a state injunction of picketing in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co.15 In Giboney, the state court enjoined union picketing of Empire
Storage and Ice Company carried out to compel Empire to stop selling ice
to non-union peddlers. This picketing, which resulted in an eighty-five
percent business loss to Empire, was enjoined as a violation of a state
anti-trade restraint law. The Supreme Court held the injunction to be
lawful enforcement of the state policy, and found that the first amendment did not protect picketing conducted for an unlawful purpose.
In 1957, the Court found that the state had validly enjoined picketing
carried out in furtherance of the illegal objective of coercing employees in
the selection of a bargaining representative in Teamsters Local 695 v.
Vogt, Inc.'s In Vogt, the Court confirmed that the "illegal objective" theory could take precedence over the picketers' first amendment rights, regardless of whether state policy was expressed in the form of a state statute or merely a judicial announcement. "
12. Id. at 775.
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.
Court

Id.

Id. at 726.
336 U.S. 490 (1949).
354 U.S. 284 (1957).
Id. at 293; See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), cited by the Vogt
as an example of state policy announced by the judiciary, rather than by the state
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The Court's use of the "illegal objective" theory reveals its progressively permissive view of governmental control of picketing that applies
economic pressure to achieve its goals. In weighing first amendment interests against unlawful objectives, the Court went so far as to defer to state
control when the unlawful objective had not even been enunciated in the
form of legislation. Further, the cases reveal that the amount of economic
loss suffered by the employer as a result of the picketing figured in the
Court's protection or prohibition of the picketing under the "illegal objective" theory. In Wohl, the Court struck down the state injunction, and
specifically noted that the picketing did not cause economic loss to the
picketed business. In contrast, the Court noted the great economic impact
on the businesses in Ritter's Cafe, Giboney, and Vogt and upheld the
state regulations." s
Another theory that the Court has applied in its analysis of picketing
and the first amendment is based on the constitutional axiom that governmental control of speech cannot be based on speech content.2' This
doctrine provides broad protection of speech and has been applied most
often in political picketing cases. The Court recently confirmed the vitality of this first amendment doctrine in the context of picketing in Police
Department v. Mosley" when it struck down a city ordinance prohibiting
all picketing within 150 feet of any school, except peaceful picketing of
any school involved in a labor dispute. Mosley is interesting and significant because of the Court's strong wording of the grounds for the decision. First, the Court held that the "ordinance is unconstitutional because
it makes an impermissible distinction between labor picketing and other
peaceful picketing."" With such broad language, the Court seemed to be
holding that a state legislature may not deny a public forum of expression
to one type of picketing if other types of picketing are permitted.2 Furthermore, the Court found that the "central problem" with the ordinance
was its content-based method of describing lawful picketing, for "above
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
legislature; Etelson, supra note 7, at 6; Note, The Invisible Hand and the Clenched Fist: Is
there a Safe Way to Picket Under the First Amendment?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 172 (1974).
18. See Note, supra note 17, at 171. There have been cases where the Court has applied
the "illegal objective" theory but has not stated the amount of economic loss suffered by the
picketed business. See, e.g., Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Hughes
v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
19. See generally Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (Black, J., concurring in part).
20. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
21. Id. at 94. The Court found that this discriminatory distinction violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 102.

22. See Etelson, supra note 7, at 12-13.
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its content.""3 Despite such unequivocal statements throughout the opinion,2" the majority left the door open for differential treatment of labor
and political pickets by stating that "discrimination among pickets must
be tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest."1 5
In Carey v. Brown,26 the Court was again faced with a state statute
prohibiting all picketing but peaceful labor picketing, this time in residential neighborhoods. The Court found this statute to be "constitutionally indistinguishable from the ordinance invalidated in Mosley.' 7 Thus,
as in Mosley, the Court struck down the statute as an impermissible attempt to regulate speech content in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments. Again, however, the Court acknowledged the possibility
that there may be governmental interests "so compelling" that a narrowly
28
drawn content-based regulation would pass constitutional scrutiny.
Another approach to the question of whether picketing can be regulated, although one which has not obtained the support of a majority of
the Court, is the view of picketing as "speech plus." 9 This theory, articulated by Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Wohl, 80 identifies
two elements present in picketing - speech and patrolling. The element
of conduct is isolated under this theory to justify imposition of restrictions which could not otherwise be imposed on "pure speech."'" The fact
that picketing has an element of conduct, however, does not automatically subject it to governmental control. As Justice Douglas recognized in
Wohl, picketing that fulfills the purpose of relaying information concerning a labor dispute is protected by the first amendment, despite its difference from "pure speech."

23. 408 U.S. at 95. The Court supports this statement with seven case citations, all of
which involved impermissible governmental restraints on political speech. The majority also
cites Justice Black's concurring opinion in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), as authority for its holding that the ordinance may not constitutionally regulate speech based on its
subject matter. Id. at 97-8.
24. Id. at 95-96, 98, 99 n.6, 102.
25. Id. at 99.
26. 100 S. Ct. 2286 (1980).
27. Id. at 2289.
28. The Court found, however, that the statute in question did not constitutionally fulfill
the state's interest in protecting the privacy of the home. Id. at 2296.
29. See Etelson, supra note 7, at 6; Note, supra note 9, at 206-07.
30. 315 U.S. at 776-77 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also, Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 326 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); Hughes v. Superior
Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (majority discussed the "plus" element of picketing, while basing the decision on the "illegal objective" theory).
31. Id. See NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 76-80 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S VARYING TREATMENT OF SECONDARY
CONSUMER PICKETING

Each of the theoretical approaches to picketing cases has been applied
by different justices of the Supreme Court when facing questions of governmental control of secondary consumer picketing. Before examining the
Court's treatment of the first amendment issues inherent in this area of
labor picketing, a brief outline of the legislative history of secondary consumer picketing will be helpful.
In 1947, Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act to prohibit secondary boycotts in section 8(b)(4).3 ' In 1959, Congress broadened
section 8(b)(4) to prohibit union appeals to any person when the object of
the appeal was to force or require that person to cease doing business
with any other person. This amendment, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), s was
aimed at eliminating union picketing at the site of a neutral secondary
employer doing business with the primary employer, with whom the
union is in direct dispute." Such picketing, regardless of its appeal directly to the secondary employer or to consumers, was made illegal when
the object was to exert pressure on the secondary employer to cease doing
business with the primary employer.""
Two provisos were added to this new section: the first explicitly provides that there is no prohibition of a primary strike or primary picketing; 6 the second protects publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose
of advising the public that the secondary employer sells a product produced by
a primary employer with whom the union has a primary
7
dispute.'
32. Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act (since amended as 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)) stated that it was an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization to engage in or to induce any employees to
engage in a:
strike or a concerted refusal ... to use, manufacture, .... handle or work on any
goods ...
or to perform any services where an object thereof is ... forcing...
any employer or other person to cease using,. . . handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer ... or to cease doing business
with any other person ....
National Labor Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, § 158(b)(4)(A), 61 Stat. 136
(amended and codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976)).
33. For the text of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), see note 1 supra.
34. Note, Labor Law - Secondary Consumer Picketing to Discourage Purchase of the
Struck Product from a Neutral Is Not Unlawful, Although the Struck Product Comprises
a Great Bulk of the Neutral's Business, 55 No'rE DAME LAW. 436 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Labor Law]; Note, Consumer Picketing and the Single-Product Secondary Employer, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 112, 112 (1979).
35. See Note, Labor Law, supra note 34, at 436.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976).
37. Id.
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Legislative debate concerning the proposed amendment to section
8(b)(4), before the provisos were added, reveals concern that a full prohibition on secondary consumer appeals would violate the first amendment."8 To quell such fears, the publicity proviso was added, although the
proviso specified that picketing was not included as a valid means of disseminating information about a labor dispute.3 9 Despite this apparent legislative prohibition of secondary consumer picketing, however, the United
States Supreme Court carved out an exception to section 8(a)(4)(ii)(B) in
NLRB v. FruitPackers Local 760 (Tree Fruits)." In Tree Fruits, a union
of fruit and vegetable packers picketed Safeway grocery stores in Seattle
that sold Washington State apples packed by non-union employees of the
primary employer. The picket signs clearly limited their appeal to consumers not to buy Washington State apples and clearly stated that the
union's dispute was with the primary employer, not with the secondary,
Safeway.
In Tree Fruits,the Court held that secondary consumer picketing did
not violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) if the union appealed to consumers not
to purchase a particular product produced by the primary employer.
against whom the union was on strike. The majority found that the picketing, directed only at the struck product, was permissible as there was no
danger of the "isolated evil" which Congress intended to prevent. The
Court described this "isolated evil" as the persuasion of consumers "to
cease trading with [the secondary employer] in order to force him to
cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary employer."' 1 The
appeal to consumers not to purchase the struck product, however, would
not require consumers to cease trading with the secondary employer. This
'2
appeal, the Court found, "is closely confined to the primary dispute.'
It is important to note, for purposes of analysis of the Supreme Court's
most recent pronouncement on the question of consumer picketing, that
the Tree Fruits Court rejected the court of appeals' rationale in reaching
the identical result in its consideratin of Tree Fruits. Thus, the Supreme
Court rejected, "for purposes of this case," the use of the appellate court's
test of whether the secondary suffered or was likely to suffer economic
loss.43 Instead, the Court worded its view of the secondary boycott prohibition as being "keyed to the coercive nature of the conduct, whether it

38. See the discussion of the legislative history in NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377
U.S. 58, 64-71 (1964); Note, The Protection Accorded Picketing by the FirstAmendment, 2
AKRON L. REV. 122, 126-27 (1969).
39. Id.
40. 377 U.S. at 58.
41. Id. at 63.
42. Id. at 72.
43. Id.

1981]

SECONDARY CONSUMER PICKETING

823

be picketing or otherwise."""
Tree Fruits was, therefore, decided on a statutory basis. The majority
summarily addressed the first amendment issues inherent in section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) with a general statement of "concern that a broad ban
against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First
Amendment.

' 45

However, despite this superficial reference to the consti-

tutional issues, the rationale of the majority opinion parallels the "illegal
objective" theory often applied by the Court when faced with first
amendment questions in the context of picketing. The majority clearly
identified the illegal objective of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) as the "isolated
evil" of persuading consumers to cease doing business with the secondary
employer in order to force the secondary to cease trading with the primary employer. As secondary consumer picketing is not conducted in furtherance of that illegal objective, it does not appeal to consumers to commit an illegal act. Therefore, the communication aspect of the picketing is
protected speech. Furthermore, despite its rejection of the economic impact test, the minor loss to the picketed business surely must have influenced the Court in Tree Fruits,just as it appears to have influenced past
Courts in Ritter's Cafe, Giboney, and Vogt."
Justice Black, concurring, and Justice Harlan, dissenting, in Tree
Fruits reached their conclusions based on the "content based" and
"speech plus" theories of picketing, respectively. Justice Black read the
statute as prohibiting secondary consumer picketing on its face, thereby
necessitating a finding on constitutional grounds. 47 He reasoned that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibited picketing based solely on the message conveyed by the picketing, and thus violated first amendment protection of
free speech.' 8
Justice Harlan, 49 like Justice Black, found the statute to prohibit secondary consumer picketing. Unlike Justice Black, however, Justice
Harlan found no constitutional infirmities under first amendment analysis. He based his opinion on Congress' ability to regulate the "non-communicative" aspects of picketing.
44. Id. at 68.
45. Id. at 63. As noted by the concurring and dissenting opinions in Tree Fruits, however, the statute, on its face, flatly prohibits all kinds of picketing. Id. at 76-93. Thus, the
majority chose to ignore the clear language of the statute by carrying out the exception for
secondary consumer picketing.
46. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
47. 337 U.S. at 76 (Black, J., concurring).
48. Id. Furthermore, Justice Black found the "illegal objective" approach inapplicable,
as the "struck product" pickets asked customers "to do something which [section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B)] itself recognizes as perfectly lawful." Id. at 79.
49. 377 U.S. at 80 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart joined in Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion.
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Furthermore, Justice Harlan's dissent foreshadowed the practical
problems of applying the struck product exception to other fact sitations.
In particular, he found the exception unworkable when a secondary employer's business consists primarily of sales of the struck product since
consumer picketing directed at the struck product in this situation would,
in effect, be identical to appeals to consumers not to patronize the secondary retailer at all.
The National Labor Relations Board grappled with the facts of Justice
Harlan's hypothetical in 1974, in Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow
Chemical)." In Dow Chemical, the union, which was on strike against
Bay Refining Division, conducted consumer picketing against six gasoline
stations selling Bay gasoline. The Board held that the picketing violated
section 8(b)(4) due to the predictability of the economic impact of picketing on the secondary employers, which grossed between eighty percent
and ninety percent of their revenues from sales of Bay gas. The Board
misstated the Tree Fruits rationale as deciding the legality of consumer
picketing based on the "minimal impact [of] the picketing. . . upon the
total business of the secondary retailer. . ..

,.5The large impact on the

secondary retailer in Dow Chemical led the Board to find that the consumer picketing had the likely effect of totally discouraging consumers
from patronizing the secondary retailers.
The Board's interpretation, or reinterpretation, of Tree Fruits was confirmed in 1980 by the Supreme Court in a six-to-three decision, NLRB v.
Retail Store Employee's Local 1001 (Safeco). 61 In Safeco, the primary
dispute was between the union and Safeco Title Insurance Company,
against whom the union was on strike in Seattle. In furtherance of this
dispute, the union picketed five local title companies. The companies derived over ninety percent of their gross revenues from the sale of Safeco
insurance. The Board had held, consistent with its decision in Dow
Chemical, that the picketing violated section 8(b)(4), as it was "reasonably calculated to induce customers not to patronize the neutral parties at
all."53 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the
Board's order in a literal interpretation of Tree Fruits, and found the
picketing to fall within the protected exception of consumer picketing."
The Supreme Court upheld the Board's order in an opinion that reflects the absence of a theoretical basis for the result. Rather, the major50. 211 N.L.R.B. 649, 86 L.R.R.M. 1381 (1974), enforcement denied, 5"24 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), complaint dismissed on remand, 229 N.L.R.B. 302,
96 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1977). See Note, LABOR LAw, supra note 34, at 443-44.
51. Id. at 651.
52. 100 S. Ct. at 2372.
53. 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 757, 93 L.R.R.M. 1338, 1340 (1976).
54. 600 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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ity shifted to a purely pragmatic approach to secondary consumer picketing. While it did not expressly adopt the "economic impact test" rejected
by the Tree Fruits Court, the Safeco majority's statement that "the resulting injury to [the secondary retailers'] businesses is distinctly different from the injury .. .in Tree Fruits"" indicates that the Court has
indeed applied the economic impact test. This conclusion is reinforced by
the Court's further statement that "[p]roduct picketing that reasonably
can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss
square with the language or the purpose of [section)
simply does not
8(b)(4)(ii)(B). ''
Thus, unlike the Court in Tree Fruits, the majority in Safeco did not
apply the "illegal objective" test of picketing. The rejection by the Court
in Safeco of this test is easily explained. Had the majority been consistent
in applying the "illegal objective" test, it could not have reached the desired result of prohibiting the picketing, as Tree Fruits established that
secondary consumer picketing directed only toward the struck product
does not advance an unlawful goal. The "illegal objective" test could not
be manipulated under these facts, as had been done in the past, to enjoin
picketing which resulted in great economic loss to the picketed business. 5
Therefore, the majority, left without a legal rationale upon which to base
its opinion, chose to ban the picketing based solely on its conclusion that
the economic impact of the picketing was too harsh.
With regard to the first amendment issues at hand, the majority in
Safeco was equally lax in its analysis. The Court found it a "well-established understanding" that picketing in furtherance of the "unlawful objective" of coercing customers to boycott a secondary employer does not
violate the first amendment." As the dissent correctly pointed out, however, the holding in Tree Fruits had been that secondary consumer picketing furthers the illegal objective of coercion under section 8(b)(4) only
when the picketing is directed at nonprimary goods. 59 Obviously mindful
of this inconsistency, the Safeco majority reshaped the "illegal objective"
theory beyond recognition, and held that, when "picketing . . . predictably encourages consumers to boycott a secondary business," section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not unlawfully restrict the first amendment."
The damage resulting from the majority's slipshod approach to first
amendment analysis is clear. After Safeco, unions engaging in secondary
consumer picketing must guess at the degree of their first amendment
55.

100 S. Ct. at 2377.

56. Id.
57. See notes 9-18 supra and accompanying text.
58. 100 S. Ct. at 2378 (citing Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951)).
59. 100 S. Ct. at 2380 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 2379 (emphasis added).
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freedom to express their side of a primary labor dispute. The majority
has balanced these constitutional freedoms on an undefined and unknown
point at which the economic loss to the secondary business becomes so
great as to outweigh the unions' constitutional rights. The Court admitted its uncertainty by leaving future cases to be decided on a case by case
basis, dependent on the National Labor Relations Board's "expertise" in
measuring economic impact.61
The separate opinions submitted by the other justices reflect the continued disagreement over the proper theory to be applied to the first
amendment questions involved in secondary consumer picketing. Justice
Brennan, who delivered the majority opinion in Tree Fruits,authored the
dissenting opinion in Safeco, joined by Justices White and Marshall.
While remaining consistent in the statutory analysis of the issues, Justice
Brennan continued his use of the "illegal objective" theory to test the
lawfulness of the picketing. Therefore, according to the dissent, as secondary consumer picketing is illegal only if it coerces consumers to cease
buying non primary goods, the union in Safeco acted lawfully in directing
its consumer appeal solely to the struck product, regardless of the resulting economic loss to the secondary.'2
Justices Stevens and Blackmun each wrote separate opinions concurring in the result, but differing from the majority's treatment of the first
amendment issues. Both Justices recognized that the regulation of picketing upheld in Safeco wab based on the content of the message conveyed
by the picketers, which would normally be an impermissble basis of control. Justice Stevens, however, viewed the regulation in Safeco to be constitutionally permissible as reaching only the "conduct element of picketing."' 63 Justice Blackmun also found the regulation to be constitutionally
sound in light of the "greater weight" of the governmental interest in protecting neutrals from "coerced participation in industrial strife.""
The concurring opinions, although more detailed than the majority's in
first amendment analysis, are hardly more satisfying. Both justices acknowledged the content-based nature of the regulation, and yet seized
unsound theories to support the governmental restrictions. Justice Stevens justified the restriction on secondary picketing by applying the
"speech plus" theory. He found that section 8(b)(4)(B)(ii) regulates only
the "conduct" of picketing. This restriction on the conduct of picketing,
he concluded, is supported by the governmental purpose of protecting
neutral employers from other parties' labor disputes. However, Justice
Stevens did not justify his view that the conduct element in picketing in a
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2378.
at 2381.
at 2379 (Stevens, J., concurring).
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
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labor context is a stronger force than in political picketing, and hence
subject to greater regulation." Justice Blackmun's reasoning is reminiscent of the "illegal objective" approach applied by the Court in Vogt,
which upheld regulation of picketing conducted in violation of a "state
policy."" Like the majority opinion, however, such an analysis leaves a
void in defining the degree at which the governmental interest becomes so
great as to override first amendment freedoms. Furthermore, it is unclear
why the economic impact on the secondary employer transforms picketing in furtherance of a lawful objective, as in Tree Fruits, into picketing
in furtherance of an unlawful objective, as in Safeco.

IV.

CONTINUED VARYING TREATMENT OF SECONDARY CONSUMER

PICKETING?

The narrowing of the Tree Fruits holding by Safeco and the corresponding expansion of the area of governmental regulation of consumer
picketing has already made its way into one of the circuit courts of appeals. In Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 67 the Sixth Circuit addressed the question
of whether the union violated section 8(a)(4)(ii)(B) by its consumer picketing of Kroger supermarkets. The union's picket signs clearly identified
the union's primary dispute with Duro Paper Bag Manufacturing Company and requested consumers to bring their own bags to hold their groceries." The National Labor Relations Board 6' found that the union was
engaged in lawful picketing. The Board reached this conclusion by applying the merged products doctrine, which holds secondary consumer picketing illegal when the boycotted primary goods or services have become
fully merged into non-primary products.70 When the boycotted product is
merged with non-primary products, the boycott necessarily urges consumers to cease buying non-primary products as well as the struck product.
The Board found, however, that the Duro brand paper bags had not
become merged with Kroger's non-primary goods or services, as other
means of carrying groceries were possible. Therefore, the secondary con65. Id. CompareJustice Stevens' reasoning in Safeco with the majority opinion in Carey
v. Brown, in which Justice Stevens joined, and which held a state statute unconstitutional in
its unjustified preference of labor picketing over political picketing.
66. See notes 16-18 supra'andaccompanying text.
67. 105 L.R.R.M. 2897 (Oct. 27, 1980).
68. In addition to picketing, the union also distributed handbills identifying the primary
dispute. The distribution of handbills was not challenged. Id. at 2897.
69. United Paperworkers Intl Local 832, 236 N.L.R.B. 1525, 98 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1978).
Members Fanning, Jenkins and Truesdale joined in the Board decision.
70. Id. at 1527, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1431. See, e.g. Teamsters Local 327 (American Bread
Co.), 170 N.L.R.B. 91, 67 L.R.R.M. 1427 (1968); Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37, 167
N.L.R.B. 1030, 66 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1967); enforced, 401 F.2d 952 (1968).
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sumer picketing, directed only at the struck primary product, was not
unlawfully aimed at encouraging consumers to stop trading with the neutral secondary.
The Sixth Circuit, delivering its opinion in Kroger Co. after the Supreme Court's Safeco decision, mixed the merged products doctrine with
the Court's theory in Safeco that picketing which "predictably encourages consumers to boycott a business" 1 may be enjoined. The court of
appeals, following this reasoning, held that "the Board should have restricted its inquiry to the likely result of the Union's appeal if it accomplished its boycott. . . ."72 The court found, contrary to the Board, that
the boycotted paper bags had merged into Kroger's business and thus
concluded that the "likely result"of the secondary boycott would be to
persuade consumers to cease doing business with the neutral secondary,
Kroger.7
In Kroger Co., the Sixth Circuit made the error of identifying primary
product boycotts of single product retailers with merged product boycotts. As the dissent noted in Safeco, the merged product doctrine follows
logically from the Tree Fruits test.74 Since secondary consumer picketing
of a struck primary product that has merged with non-primary goods necessarily goes beyond the primary dispute, the Tree Fruits test would allow the picketing to be enjoined. Furthermore, as the dissent in Safeco
pointed out, a secondary retailer may carry other nonmerged products
and allow the consumer to continue patronizing the secondary employer.
Although the majority in Kroger purported to read Safeco as retaining
the Tree Fruits test of whether an object of the secondary consumer picket is to involve the secondary in the primary dispute, 5 its adoption of the
Safeco test of the "likely result" of the picketing reveals the implications
for future cases. In cases not involving merged product boycotts, there is
no guide for predicting the likely result of a secondary picket of a business which normally derives over half of its gross revenue from sales of
the struck primary product. This situation leaves the Board and the
courts with complete discretion for determining the point at which the
object of the secondary picketing is to coerce consumers not to do business at all with the secondary employer. Any movement from the Safeco
dissent's. position upholding all secondary consumer picketing aimed only
at the struck product, therefore, must result in rule by judicial and administrative fiat.

71. 100 S. Ct. at 2379.
72. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2900.
73. Id. at 2889. The circuit court set aside the dismissal of the complaint and remanded
the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
74. 100 S. Ct. at 2380.
75. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2889.
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The dissenting opinion in Kroger presents the same problems of broad
judicial discretion in future cases. Although the dissenting judge expressed concern for first amendment freedoms, he found that the governmental interest in enforcing consumer picketing that "threatens the employer with severe loss" outweighed the picketers' interest in free
speech. 6 The dissent, however, proposed no guidelines for determining
the point at which the governmental interest overcomes the union's first
amendment rights.
Therefore, lower federal courts as well as the National Labor Relations
Board will be faced with a dilemma in future cases involving secondary
consumer picketing. In attempting to follow both Tree Fruits and Safeco,
judges and Board members must acknowledge the Tree Fruits holding
that picketing aimed only at the struck product does not constitute an
illegal object. This holding, however, is irreconcilable with the Safeco
holding that consumer picketing of a struck product may be found to violate section 8(a)(4)(ii)(B). The lower tribunals will, therefore, have sole
discretion to enjoin the picketing on a case by case basis. The result will
be a grant of overly broad power to the Board and the courts to regulate a
form of expression protected by the first amendment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since the Supreme Court decided Thornhill v. Alabama, there has
been no doubt that "dissemination of information concerning the facts of
a labor dispute" is protected by the first amendment. When faced with
picketing as a form of expression used to disseminate labor information,
however, the Court has been divided with regard to the proper theory to
apply in deciding whether the picketing was constitutionally protected.
Thus, the issue of governmental regulation of labor picketing has been
addressed by the Supreme Court justices, who have applied in various
cases the "illegal objective" theory, the "speech plus" theory, and the
"content based" theory. Application of the "illegal objective" theory has
been used by the majority most often in labor picketing cases. Examination of these cases reveals that the amount of economic loss suffered by
the picketed employer appears to have influenced the Court in upholding
or striking down governmental regulations of the picketing. In cases in
which the economic pressure placed on the picketed employer had a more
pronounced effect, the Court has shown greater willingness to permit the
governmental control of expression.
While the "speech plus" and "content based" theories have not formed
the basis of a Supreme Court majority opinion in labor picketing cases,

76.

Id. at 2901.
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these theories have been applied by different justices in their separate
opinions. These two theories take their places at opposite ends of the
spectrum, with the "speech plus" theory permitting the greatest restrictions on picketing, and the "content based" theory serving as the
broadest protection of expression through picketing.
In the narrower area of secondary consumer picketing directed toward
the primary product, the Court is also divided on the issue of the proper
first amendment theory to be applied. In Tree Fruits, while the majority
purported to decide the case purely on a statutory basis, the reasoning of
the decision paralleled the "illegal objective" theory in finding that the
secondary consumer picketing was not carried out in furtherance of the
statutory "isolated evil" of persuading consumers to cease all trading with
the secondary employer in order to force him to cease dealing with the
primary employer.
The "speech plus" and "content based" theories each surfaced in separate opinions in Tree Fruits.Predictably, application of the "speech plus"
theory was recommended in order to uphold the restriction on picketing,
while use of the "content based" theory would have found section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) unconstitutional under the first amendment.
The last word from the Supreme Court on secondary consumer picketing came in the Safeco case. The Safeco majority opinion shows a breakdown of the theoretical base of Tree Fruits. In holding that section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) allows restriction of secondary consumer picketing which
"threaten[s] neutral parties with ruin and substantial loss," 7 the majority
takes a purely pragmatic approach with no guidelines for future cases.
The impact of Safeco on first amendment interests of unions conducting secondary consumer picketing is devastating. Unions are left to
guess whether they may exercise their first amendment freedoms without
penalty. The case by case approach approved by the Safeco majority will
leave the unions continually uncertain of possible future liability, as each
case will be decided on a factual basis. Furthermore, the irreconcilable
nature of the Tree Fruits and Safeco holdings will result in inconsistent
theories from the lower courts as they attempt to apply both holdings to
future cases.
The full effect of Safeco on the first amendment rights of the picketers
becomes clearer by comparing Safeco with past Supreme Court decisions.
Safeco prohibits secondary consumer picketing based on the economic
impact on the secondary employer. Therefore, the Safeco court would
permit restriction of expression when the picketing is effective in conveying the message. This restriction violates the basic principle of Thornhill,
which taught that methods of expression cannot be restricted merely be-

77.

100 S. Ct. at 2377.
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cause the picketing is successful in persuading individuals to follow its
requests. The restriction of expression in Safeco is not saved by the "illegal object" cases, since the picketing was not carried out in furtherance of
an unlawful end. For, as the Safeco dissent pointed out, Tree Fruits held
that picketing was not conducted in furtherance of an illegal objective
when it is directed only at the struck product. Finally, the Court's recent
cases of Police Department v. Mosley 8 and Carey v. Brown 79 bring home
the difference in protection afforded political picketing as compared with
labor picketing. The Court in Mosley and in Carey v. Brown used the
"content based" theory to find unconstitutional ordinances, which, ironically, prohibited political picketing while allowing labor picketing.80 Apparently, in Safeco, the economic effects of the labor picketing earned it
less protection than other types of expression.
The Safeco decision must be reevaluated in the light of the vital first
amendment interests of the picketers. Tree Fruits clearly enunciated the
finding that secondary consumer picketing does not fulfill an illegal objective when directed only at the struck primary product. By reshaping the
definition of the illegal objective to depend on the economic impact on
the secondary employer, the Court in Safeco distorted the Tree Fruits
holding. As a result, first amendment interests will receive no protection
when the amount of impact on the secondary employer is found to outweigh the picketers' first amendment rights. Such an arbitrary method of
measuring constitutional rights will surely lead to inconsistent and inequitable results.

78. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
80. Carey v. Brown, note 26 supra, decided the same day as Safeco, found the state
legislature's favoring of labor picketing over political picketing to be impermissible.

